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Article text: 
 
In the aftermath of the vote for the UK to leave the EU, several possible scenarios 
could allow Scotland to remain in, writes Eve Hepburn. She argues that, while it may 
prove difficult for Scotland to block Brexit or to keep EU membership while the rest 
of the UK leaves, it would also face challenges in attempting to join the EU as an 
independent state. 
 
In the aftermath of the Brexit vote – whereby Scotland voted 62 per cent in favour 
of remaining in the EU, but 52 per cent of the UK as a whole voted against – 
Scottish First Minister Nicola Sturgeon has stated that the prospect of taking 
Scotland out of the EU against its will is ‘democratically unacceptable’. 
 
Sturgeon has vowed to explore all options to keep Scotland in the EU. But what 
might these options be? And how likely are they to be successful? Here I will try to 
identify four possible scenarios – amidst myriad possibilities and uncertainties – 
that might allow Scotland to stay in the EU. 
 
No Exit? 
 
The first scenario is that the UK does not exit the EU after all. The process of 
withdrawing from the EU and disentangling UK laws from forty years of European 
legislation and directives, is going to take many years of negotiation. Indeed, PM 
David Cameron has left the decision to activate Article 50 – setting a two-year 
countdown to Brexit – to his successor, whoever that might be, at a later point in 
time. 
 
During these years of negotiations with Brussels, we may see changes in leadership 
(especially if an election is called), raising the possibility of the UK government 
seeking to steer a different course on the UK’s relations with Europe. Furthermore, 
the UK Parliament will be able to vote on any withdrawal deal. 
 
Given that there is a current majority in favour of remaining in the EU, they may 
withhold their consent and/or demand some form of ‘EU membership light’ – if, of 
course, that’s even possible given the attitude of EU leaders towards the UK right 
now. SNP MPs are likely to be active in opposing any withdrawal treaty in the UK 
Parliament. 
 
Withholding Consent 
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If UK exit from the European Union is, on the other hand, pursued and approved by 
both the UK government and a majority in the UK Parliament, then it is arguable 
that such significant legislation should also be approved by the devolved 
administrations. And it is highly likely that a majority in the Scottish Parliament will 
not approve the Brexit withdrawal deal (given that MSPs are overwhelmingly in 
favour of EU membership) – or, in legal terms, Scotland will ‘withhold legislative 
consent’. 
 
This may (or may not) put a spanner in the works for Brexit. Under the revised 
Scotland Act, Section 28, ‘it is recognised that the Parliament of the United 
Kingdom will not normally legislate with regard to devolved matters without the 
consent of the Scottish Parliament’. 
 
While the EU is a reserved matter, European legislation has a huge impact on 
devolved matters (indeed, by some estimates, 80 per cent of devolved legislation in 
Scotland is affected by the EU) and thus exiting the EU could be interpreted as 
changing the nature of the devolution settlement and thus devolved matters. 
 
However, this is a complex legal issue, open to political interpretation, and the UK 
might decide to ignore the Scottish Parliament’s withholding of consent to 
withdraw from the UK, or indeed narrowly reject the interpretation that EU 
membership affects devolved matters. Though it is also possible, given that the 
majority of MPs favour EU membership, that the need for Scottish consent could be 
used as a political weapon to defeat any ‘full withdrawal’ treaty at Westminster 
under the first option above. 
 
Scotland (and NI) Stays – The Rest of the UK Leaves? 
 
If Scotland’s attempt to withhold consent on Brexit does not have the desired 
effect, and the UK Parliament and Government plough on with Brexit regardless, 
there is a third (far more tricky) option. Scotland could try to retain EU membership 
(possibly together with Northern Ireland), by representing the part of the UK that 
seeks to remain in the EU. 
 
Here, the closest model is Greenland, which seceded from the EU in 1985 while still 
being a part of Denmark. However, this model may not be easily transplanted to the 
UK-Scottish situation. Greenland has a different constitutional relationship to 
Denmark – it is a ‘federacy’, with much stronger powers to veto any 
Danish/external attempts to alter its competences. 
 
Indeed, Greenland has the right to veto any international treaty that affects its 
powers. Scotland, at present, does not have such legislative clout. If it were a 
federacy, then Scotland would have been able to reject more easily Brexit as 
negatively affecting its competences. Still, Greenland provides a useful example of 
only part of a state seceding from the EU, which could form the basis of a legal case 
to keep Scotland (representing the UK) in the EU. 
 
IndyRef #2 
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The final option, if all else fails, is for Scotland to hold another referendum on 
independence. Nicola Sturgeon has confirmed that this option is on the table, given 
the ‘significant and material change in circumstances’ that a possible Brexit creates. 
However, there are a few hurdles to achieving the desired outcome. 
 
First, there would have to be a large and sustained swing in support in favour of 
independence. A few days after the referendum, a poll put support for independence 
at 59 per cent. However, Sturgeon has previously said that she would not seek 
another IndyRef until polls consistently showed that 60 per cent of the public 
wished to leave the UK. 
 
It is too early to say whether this level of support will be sustained. Second, the UK 
government would have to agree to another IndyRef, which is probable, but new 
conditions may be imposed on any future agreement with Edinburgh. And third, the 
EU would have to approve Scotland’s application. 
 
Here, it is likely that Scotland would have to apply as a newly independent state 
under Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union, though given its previous EU 
membership and compliance with EU laws Scotland’s application may be fast-
tracked. But this all depends on the views of EU Member States. And while a senior 
German politician recently said he would welcome Scotland in the EU as a new 
member, other states facing secessionist movements at home – such as Spain, 
Belgium and Italy – may not be so sympathetic. 
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